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EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE
SPEED OF A VEHICLE: THE STATUS OF
NORTH CAROLINA LAW AND THE
STATE OF THE ART
LAWRENCE F. MAZER, ESQ., CHARLES R. MANNING, PHD., P.E.,
RICHARD T. EDWARDS, P.E., MICHAEL A. SUTTON, P.E.t
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states that
a witness, qualified as an expert, may testify, in the form of an
opinion, if scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact.' This "helpfulness" standard has opened the door
to opinion testimony on such subjects as a decedent's state of mind
at the time of his death by an expert who never saw the decedent,2
credibility of children who report sexual abuse,3 and the general
packaging of marijuana.4 North Carolina law is unsettled as to
whether this "helpfulness" standard extends to an expert's opinion
testimony regarding the speed of a vehicle.
The speed of a vehicle is a critical fact to be proved in a vari-
ety of cases. The fact is contested in civil negligence cases5 and
criminal cases.6 Eyewitness testimony regarding the speed of a
vehicle can vary widely. In State v. McQueen, three witnesses
placed the speed of a vehicle at between 95 to 100 miles per hour,
at 75 miles per hour, and at between 60 to 70 miles per hour
respectively. 7 Two of the witnesses observed the vehicle for
t Mr. Mazer is Associate General Counsel for Carolina Power and Light
Company and Messrs. Manning, Edwards, and Sutton are engineers for Accident
Reconstuction Analysis, Inc.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (1992).
2. Harvey v. Raleigh Police Department, 85 N.C. App. 540, 355 S.E.2d 147,
cert. denied, 320 N.C. 631, 360 S.E.2d 86 (1987).
3. State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 354 S.E.2d 527, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 174,
358 S.E.2d 64 (1987).
4. State v. Chisholm, 90 N.C. App. 526, 369 S.E.2d 375 (1988).
5. Hicks v. Love, 201 N.C. 773, 161 S.E. 394 (1931).
6. State v. Purdie, 93 N.C. App. 269, 377 S.E.2d 789 (1989).
7. State v. McQueen, 9 N.C. App. 248, 250, 175 S.E.2d 789, 790 (1970).
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approximately one minute and the third for approximately 245
yards." Wide disparity in observations is not uncommon.
Studies have documented the degree of accuracy and reliabil-
ity of eyewitness testimony.9 An observer's capacity to interpret
audio or visual stimuli, as well as an individual's ability to recall
the stored information without changes in recollection depend on
numerous variables. These variables include external or environ-
mental factors and the personal background and experience of the
Witness.
A witness to a motor vehicle accident could be an involved
driver, an uninvolved motorist, or a bystander. Each of these indi-
viduals may be stationary or moving, and each person may also
see the accident from a different physical position. As a conse-
quence, multiple witnesses to a single accident, as evidenced in
McQueen, often have differing if not contradictory descriptions of
the same event. 10
II. THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESSES
Most automobile collisions, specifically the moment of impact,
occur in a time period of approximately one tenth of a second. The
precise time of impact can be scientifically verified by dividing the
typical crush depths or changes of overall body length observed
after an accident by the vehicular closing speeds. In addition, the
events leading up to a collision may take place within a few
seconds. The heightened alertness expected of an individual
aware of an impending collision may not be experienced by any
party until the actual impact takes place. As a result, an observer
may not attach significance to the actions of a motor vehicle
unless the vehicle attracts the observer's attention."
Once the collision takes place, and before the individual is
questioned, a witness will have time to contemplate the sensory
information remembered before, during, and after the accident.
Furthermore, the witness may walk around the accident scene in
an attempt to piece together the sequence of events which defined
8. Id.
9. Gary L. Wells and D.M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEwiTNEss
TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 161 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F.
Loftus eds., 1984).
10. McQueen, 9 N.C. App. at 250, 175 S.E.2d at 790.
11. Luther 0. Cox, Jr. et al., Improving Witness Contributions to
Reconstruction and Animation, in ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND
ANIMATION II SP-907 62 (Terry D. Day and Wesley D. Grimes eds., 1992).
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the accident. During this time the witness' recollection may be
clouded or distorted by interaction with other witnesses. The
viewing and possible misinterpretation of physical evidence can
also influence the witness's account. 12
Automobile collisions are unexpected traumatic events, which
place witnesses in a stressful environment during and after an
accident. The bias of an interviewer, if any, as well as the form of
the questions (i.e., leading or suggestive) can influence the recol-
lection.' 3 In one study developed to monitor changes in eyewitness
recollections of complex events, witnesses viewed a film of an
automobile accident, and then answered questions concerning
what they saw.14 Some of the subjects were asked questions which
introduced misleading or false information.' 5 Witnesses were six
times more likely to recall seeing a nonexistent event or object
when presented with misleading or false information. 16 In another
study using a similar methodology eighty percent of the witnesses
indicated that their recollections of the accident were influenced
by the misinformation.' 7
People generally judge time and distance based on some mem-
orized or familiar measurement standard. For example, the com-
parison of a distance to the length of a football field or length of a
courtroom is often used in the examination of witnesses at trial.
Recollections based on these familiar cues can result in erroneous
descriptions. Similarly, most people have a concept of the length of
a second from the use of clocks or stopwatches. However, as a
whole, witness estimates of time are even less reliable than the
judgment of distance. Frequently, a witness will state that the
accident seemed to occur in slow motion, showing that an individ-
ual's concept of time is easily distorted. To judge the speed of an
automobile, a witness must be able to estimate time and distance
with reasonable accuracy. Therefore, an observer must have ade-
quate opportunity to see a vehicle in relation to a known visual
cue or cues over a finite period of time.'"
12. Id.
13. David F. Hall et al., Postevent Information and Changes in Recollection for
a Natural Event, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 131
(Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984).
14. See generally, ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Cox et al., supra note 11, at 63.
1994]
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The perception of the speed of a vehicle can be influenced by
its surroundings, its relationship to moving or stationary objects,
and its distance and direction of travel with respect to the
observer. All of these factors can be further complicated by the
speed and direction of travel of the observer in relation to the
observed vehicle. 9
The authors of this article have been conducting a study of
witness observations of vehicle speed. The methodology of these
studies involve comparing the best guesses of subjects against the
radar gun measured speeds of oncoming, departing, and passing
vehicles. In the test, subjects observed the vehicles from a stand-
ing position in daylight, and they could both see and hear the
vehicle. The subjects were also not significantly restricted with
respect to the amount of time available to judge speed. The sub-
jects were under extremely advantageous circumstances since
they were not distracted by maintaining control over their own
vehicle or avoiding a collision. These ongoing perceptional stud-
ies have already demonstrated that the vehicle's direction of
travel significantly affects the accuracy of the subjects' estimation
of speed. The studies show that individuals could judge speed
more accurately for vehicles traveling away from their position as
opposed to vehicles traveling towards or perpendicular to their
position.
A possible explanation for the accuracy of observation of vehi-
cles traveling away from the witness could be the addition of
sound stimuli from the passing vehicle in combination with an
extended viewing time as the vehicle traveled away from the
observer's position. The observers did not have the benefit of this
combination of stimuli or duration in the other two test scenarios.
The results of the tests raise an important factor in witness per-
ception - sound and sound variations. That is, sound perception
is a essential factor in determining vehicular speed.
Observed witnesses would change an estimation of speed
solely based on the magnitude of sound from a vehicle. For exam-
ple, observers can associate loud engine noise with high speed,
which may or may not be the case. It is also not unusual for a
witness to give an opinion of speed based only on a loud engine
without any visual observations. The wide range of variables
which affect auditory information would make sound aided speed
19. Id.
[Vol. 16:191
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estimation suspect at best.2 ° Such variables include frequency,
amplitude, acoustic attenuation, echo effects, chamber resonance,
refraction, and reflection of sounds by physical surfaces. 2 '
The test results also suggested that longer viewing times
tended to increase the accuracy of the speed estimation. However,
in real accident situations, the amount of time surrounding the
entire accident sequence could be minimal. As mentioned previ-
ously, actual collisions take place in the order of a tenth of a sec-
ond. If a vehicle is traveling 55 mph prior to a collision, it would be
covering 81 feet per second. If a witness has the opportunity to
observe the vehicle for three seconds before the collision, the car
would travel 243 feet. If the speed is increased by 10 mph (15 feet
per second), the car would travel 288 feet. Therefore, a witness
would have to differentiate between 243 feet and 288 feet by eye
and discern the elapsed time to begin to have an accurate founda-
tion for speed estimation. The difficulty is understandably magni-
fied if the observation period is decreased. For example, if a
witness views the vehicle for one-half of a second, then the vari-
ance in distance is reduced by only seven feet in 288 (2.43%),
which is most likely outside the perceptional accuracy of most
observers even in the most ideal situations.2 2 Given the possible
fallibility of eyewitness observation of vehicle speed, expert testi-
mony would seem to be a logical means of helping the finder of fact
reach a decision regarding this critical fact.
III. THE STATUS OF NORTH CAROLINA LAW IN REGARDS TO
ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY FROM EXPERT WITNESSES
AS TO SPEED OF A VEHICLE
Two North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions made within
seventeen months of one another have created uncertainty in
20. This same conclusion was reached in the court of appeals where the court
refused to admit the testimony of a witness who heard but did not see the
vehicle. Hicks v. Reavis, 78 N.C. App. 315 , 319, 337 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1985).
21. A review of the variables affecting the measurement of sound can be found
in any authoritative text on acoustics written at the college postgraduate level.
Many of the principles are discussed adequately in undergraduate physics texts.
See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., MODERN PHYsics (1959).
22. But see Beaman v. Sheppard, 35 N.C. App. 73, 239 S.E.2d 864 (1978). The
court of appeals determined that a witness had a reasonable opportunity to
observe and thus testify regarding the speed of an oncoming vehicle observed for
approximately four car lengths or 80 feet. The witness testified the vehicle was
traveling 65 to 70 mph. The witness's observation time could not have exceeded
two-thirds of one second.
1994] 195
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North Carolina law as it regards the admissablity of expert testi-
mony to prove speed of a vehicle. The traditional North Carolina
view was espoused in Coley v. Garris .23 In Coley the trial court
admitted opinion evidence of a North Carolina highway patrol
officer who had investigated the accident scene, including gouge
and scuff marks, and interviewed witnesses.24 Based on this
investigation the officer concluded that the plaintiffs motorcycle
was traveling at a speed of approximately seventy-five miles per
hour.25 Plaintiff, on appeal, contended that the testimony of the
officer should have been excluded because his opinion was not
based on his personal observation.26
The court of appeals, citing Tyndall v. Hines Co. 27, stated, "It
has long been the rule in North Carolina that 'one who did not see
a vehicle in motion will not be permitted to give an opinion as to
its speed.' ",28 The court acknowledged that the witness could
describe the physical evidence at the scene, including the damage
to the vehicle involved, but that the jury is "as well qualified as
the witness to determine what inferences the facts will permit or
require."29 No doubt the court in Coley was guided by the unequiv-
ocal statement contained in Shaw v. Sylvester,3 ° which represents
the first North Carolina case to deal with the subject of expert
testimony on vehicle speed. The Shaw court, citing Arkansas pre-
cedent, stated, "This case furnishes a good illustration why 'courts
look with disfavor upon attempts to reconstruct traffic accidents
by means of expert testimony, owing to the impossibility of estab-
lishing with certainty the many factors that must be taken into
consideration.' "31
The court of appeals expressed a contrary view in State v.
Purdie.32 In Purdie an accident reconstruction expert testified in
an involuntary manslaughter case that the vehicle accident
involving the defendant occurred in the victim's lane of travel.33
23. 87 N.C. App. 493, 361 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
24. Id. at 494, 361 S.E.2d at 428.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Tyndall v. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E.2d 828 (1946).
28. Coley, 87 N.C. App. at 495, 361 S.E.2d at 428.
29. Id.
30. 253 N.C. 176, 116 S.E.2d 351 (1960).
31. Shaw, 253 N.C. at 179-80, 116 S.E.2d at 355 (citing Conway v. Hudspeth,
318 S.W.2d 137 (Ark. 1958)).
32. 93 N.C. App. 269, 377 S.E.2d 789 (1989).
33. Id. at 273, 377 S.E.2d at 791.
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The expert, a civil engineer who had investigated approximately
1,000 accidents, relied upon the police report, interviews, and pho-
tographs of the accident scene. 4 The expert testified that the laws
of physics, the rotation and final resting point of the vehicles, loca-
tion of debris and gouge marks, and the contact points on the vehi-
cles contradicted the defendant's assertions that the victim's
vehicle had crossed the center line. 5
Purdie on appeal identified eleven assignments of error con-
cerning the admission of the expert's testimony. In rejecting each
error the court of appeals determined that the expert was in a bet-
ter position than the jury to determine which lane of travel the
accident occurred based upon scientific principles.36 The court also
determined that the conclusion of the expert was not hindered by
the fact that the expert had no firsthand knowledge, had not vis-
ited the scene nor interviewed witnesses.3 7 Finally, it appeared
that the court was not at all troubled by the fact that five eyewit-
nesses testified about the same subject matter as the expert.
Despite the fact that the state's expert in Purdie only testified
regarding the location of the accident, the court went out of its
way to address the defendant's reliance on Hicks v. Reavis.3s
Hicks presented the traditional North Carolina view that an
expert cannot testify as to the speed of a vehicle "if that opinion is
based upon physical evidence obtained at the scene rather than
personal observation."39 The Purdie court noted that the decision
in Hicks relied on Shaw and that Shaw had been decided twenty7
four years before the North Carolina Rules of Evidence had been
adopted.4" The court further stated, "The view that experts may
not rely upon skid marks, vehicle damage, rotation and resting
positions of vehicles, and other physical evidence to give an opin-
ion as to speed has been rejected by the majority of jurisdictions
deciding this question."4 '
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 275, 377 S.E.2d at 792.
37. State v. Purdie, 93 N.C. App. 269, 275-76, 377 S.E.2d 789, 792-93 (1989).
38. 78 N.C. App. 315, 337 S.E.2d 121 (1985), cert. denied, 316 N.C. 553, 344
S.E.2d 7 (1986).
39. Id. at 323, 337 S.E.2d at 125.
40. Purdie, 93 N.C. App. at 276, 377 S.E.2d at 793.
41. Id. The court cited 29 A.L.R. 3d 248 (1970) (Supp. 1988); 93 A.L.R. 2d 287
(1964) (Later Case Serv. 1983) (Supp. 1988) and the disfavor noted by Professors
Brandis and Broun. See 1 BRANDIS AND BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE,
Sec. 183, n.165 (4th ed. 1993). Professor Broun in this note states, "The original
1994]
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North Carolina's minority view, as represented by the deci-
sion in Coley, and the line of cases which preceded it, including
Shaw, Tyndall, and Hicks, all concerned the admissibility of testi-
mony by state troopers or other law enforcement officers. An anal-
ysis of this line of cases could easily conclude that the North
Carolina view is based on the court's displeasure over the use of
state troopers and other police officers as experts in civil cases as
opposed to the view that experts per se have nothing to offer the
finder of fact.42
In rejecting the defendant's argument that the admission of
the trooper's expert testimony was not prejudicial, the Coley court
stated:
Trooper Booth "was a State employee whose duty it was to make a
disinterested and impartial investigation of the accident. In so
doing he was a representative of the state. His testimony should,
and no doubt did, carry great weight with the jury."43
The power of persuasion of a trooper or other police officer,
coupled with the skepticism the court has traditionally shown
towards this type of analysis, may have led the court to articulate
a broad brush position which rejects all experts who are offered for
this purpose. The issue that now confronts the judiciary, given the
conflicting views articulated in Coley and Purdie, is whether the
science inherent in accident reconstruction analysis, which is used
to determine the speed of a vehicle from physical facts found at
the scene of an accident, has sufficient reliability to be judicially
recognized in North Carolina. If the science falls within the Rule
702 "helpfulness" standard, then the courts are assigned the sin-
gular responsibility of determining if the witness has sufficient
expertise in accident reconstruction to apply these scientific prin-
ciples to the case at issue.
author of this text cogently argued that the rule limiting testimony in this regard
should apply only to lay witnesses, and not to experts. Dean Brandis agreed.
(BRA is ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, Sec. 181 (3rd ed. 1988). This author
strongly agrees with both of his predecessors, particularly in light of the
language of N.C.R. Evid. 702..." Id.
42. But see Sparks v. Gilley Trucking Co., 992 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1993)
(providing contrary opinion regarding the competence of a North Carolina
highway patrolman to testify regarding the speed of a vehicle based on an
accident investigation and reconstruction).
43. Coley, 87 N.C. App. at 496, 116 S.E.2d at 428 (citing Tyndall, 226 N.C.
App. at 623, 39 S.E.2d at 830).
198 [Vol. 16:191
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IV. THE SCIENTIFIC RELIABILITY OF SPEED DETERMINATION
USING PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICS
Experts in accident reconstruction use essentially two differ-
ent methods of speed estimation: one method utilizing the conser-
vation of linear and angular momentum and the other utilizing
the conservation of energy. The basic principles of the two meth-
ods are closely related since both ultimately come from Newtonian
physics and the primary relationship of Force = Mass x Accelera-
tion (F=ma). Accident reconstruction experts utilize both basic
methods of calculation independently, when possible, to confirm
the validity of conclusions. Both methods present "special cases"
to the accident reconstruction expert where the accident dynamics
are simplified through cancelled momentums or the absence of
friction effects (i.e., sliding on ice or flying through the air in a
ballistic trajectory). The recognition and utilization of these spe-
cial cases usually improves the accuracy of the mathematical esti-
mation. Many times, the accuracy of the calculations depends
primarily on the expert's ability to measure or estimate the coeffi-
cient of friction between the vehicle tires and the travel surface.
As a result, the mathematical tire model that is used may become
important to the final accuracy of the results.
The laws of physics state that the momentum of a system of
colliding particles (or vehicles) will have a constant value during
the period of the collision. A primary basic assumption inherent to
such an assertion is that the collision is of sufficiently short dura-
tion such that no loss of momentum occurs by friction and thermal
losses. This is particularly valid since almost all collisions are
approximately 1110 of a second in length. Since system momen-
tum is defined as the sum products of mass and velocity for the
total number of vehicles in the system, a zero summation of the
momentums before and after a collision will yield a relationship
from which the unknowns may be solved. The typical momentum
equation will look something like the following:
M1*V1 + M2*V2 = Ml*Vlf + M2*V244
where the first half of the equation represents the vehicle's mass/
velocity products before the collision and the second half repre-
sents the conditions following the collision. An illustrative "special
case" of the momentum method is the instance when two vehicles
collide head-on and both come to a complete stop at the point of
44. FRANcs W. SEARS & MARK W. ZEMANSKY, UNIVERSrrY PHysics 144-150
(1955).
1994] 199
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impact. The complete stop immediately illustrates that the two
vehicles possessed momentum of precisely equal value differing
only by the virtue of their opposed directions. Then the previously
stated equation simplifies to the expression;
M1*V1 =M2*V2, 4
Information that can be determined about either vehicle can
thereafter be converted into a velocity relationship for the oppos-
ing vehicle.
The momentum method has the most usefulness when recon-
structing two vehicle collisions of the "T" intersection variety
when the vehicles head off at measurable angles to their previous
paths of travel. It is also useful when the momentums along any
vector axis cancel as in the head-on collision just discussed. The
momentum method is dependent on the use of the vehicles' drag
factors and the physical parameters of the accident scene terrain.
Drag factors can be determined from empirical data or data
obtained experimentally using a similar vehicle under similar con-
ditions. The vehicles need not be identical, but of approximately
similar weight and configuration.
The conservation of energy applied to automobile accident
reconstruction is based on the observation that energy remains
constant during the course of a collision but merely changes form
from kinetic energy, a function of velocity, to other forms of energy
(i.e., heat energy created by tire friction with the road surface,
mechanical work of deforming the vehicular structures during the
impact, and in certain circumstances, to the change in the physi-
cal elevation of the vehicle's center of gravity). From Sir Isaac
Newton's point of view, the terms of energy, work, and heat can all
represent the same numerical quantity, so the ability to under-
stand the relationships between the different forms of energy is
essential to the expert's use of the energy method. One common
relationship used in accident reconstruction has the following
form:
2MV2 = MG(mu)D,46
where M represents the vehicle mass, V represents the vehicle's
velocity, G stands for the gravitational constant of acceleration, D
is the value of the length of the observed skid marks (physical evi-
dence), and mu represents the coefficient of friction between the
car tires and the road surface. The vehicle mass cancels out of
45. Id.
46. 2 LYNN B. FRICKE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION 90-7 (1990).
200 [Vol. 16:191
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both sides of the equation making knowledge of the vehicle weight
unnecessary for determination of the vehicle speed. The use of the
friction relationship in this equation makes it unnecessary to cal-
culate the amount of heat expended during the braking maneuver.
The work expended by the friction relationship quite accurately
represents the heat lost to braking.
Additional examples include the calculation of energy con-
sumed by a vehicle running up an incline from its post-impact
inertia,47 the flight trajectory of a flung object thrown high and
away by impact, the physical failure of a utility pole sheared off at
the ground level by a striking vehicle, 48 and the crushed profile of
a roadside guardrail. 49 All of these examples are events that leave
significant and measurable amounts of physical evidence which
may be examined and analyzed in an objective and quantitative
manner.
Perhaps the most often used and important use of the energy
analysis method is the determination of the energy consumed by
the physical crushing of the vehicular structure. The vehicle's hor-
izontal boundaries are modeled as a collection of springs which
possess mathematically linear deformation characteristics. That
is, the force of deformation is directly proportional to the depth of
deformation. Once the depth of deformation is known, only the
spring constant remains to be determined for an accurate calcula-
tion of the crush energy.5 0 This spring constant for the individual
vehicle is referred to as the stiffness constant by the National
Highway and Traffic Safety Association and the founders of the
modern day crush energy method. Raymond McHenry wrote many
of the initial investigative papers on the methods involved and
extended his work to the creation of a comprehensive set of com-
puter programs which attempt to simplify the repetitive calcula-
tions of a complete accident reconstruction. 1 Variants and
offshoots of McHenry's work still represent the most widely used
reconstruction programs today. Stiffness constants can be deter-
mined by a full scale destructive crash test of a vehicle into a
47. Id. at 90-10 to 90-18.
48. STEPHEN. P. TIMOSHENKO AND JAMES N. GOODIER, THEORY OF ELASTICITY
226-228 (1970).
49. ARCHIE HIGDON ET AL., MECHANICS OF MATERIALS 239-483 (1976).
50. RANDALL L. HARGENS AND TERRY D. DAY, VEHICLE CRUSH STIFFNESS
COEFFICIENTS FOR MODEL YEARS 1970-1984 I1-15 (1987).
51. Raymond R. McHenry, Development of a Computer Program to Aid the
Investigation of Highway Accidents, in CALSPAN REPORT No. VJ-2979-V-1, DOT
HS 800821 (1971).
1994]
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quantifiable barrier with extensive internal and external instru-
mentation. The instruments measure accelerations, velocities,
and subsequent vehicle trajectory. Documentation of the crush
depths allow the expert to calculate a particular vehicle's stiffness
constant for use in reconstructing accident speeds. Most vehicles
from the mid-70's onward have been crash tested and adequately
documented to allow the use of a reliable stiffness constant.52
At considerable expense, a private crush test can be per-
formed with the use of high speed video to measure vehicle
motion. The change in a vehicle's speed during impact may be
used to determine the resulting stiffness constant. If a test of a
particular vehicle model is not available, tests of similar vehicles
in size and structure can be collected, analyzed, and averaged to
provide a reasonable estimate of crush energy expended during a
collision. If only a single component of a structure is damaged,
the component may be simple enough to analyze by the applica-
tion of material mechanics concepts or beam theory as utilized by
many of this century's most able architects and engineers in the
construction of buildings, bridges, and other critical structures.53
For instance, often only the bumper on a large vehicle will be dam-
aged in a collision with a smaller vehicle. A force calculated from
the physical dimensions of the bumper structure can be directly
used to calculate the energy expended against it by the smaller
impacting vehicle. This type of energy calculation is highly accu-
rate since it depends only on the easily performed measurements
of structural dimensions and long established theory. In its sim-
plest implementation of this method of energy determination, the
equation is:
Energy of crush = Force x Depth of deformation.54
This method demonstrates that it is not essential to have the ben-
efit of an extensive crash test in order to accurately determine the
energy losses due to the crush deformation of a vehicle.
The spring model is a good first-order approximation for the
ends of a vehicle, but the crush characteristics of the side struc-
tures in present day automobiles have not been sufficiently
assessed. Side impact tests are more rare than frontal impact
tests because of budget constraints in the existing testing pro-
grams. Stiffness constants on side impacts can also be determined
52. HARGENS & DAY, supra note 50, at I-1 to VII-1.
53. HIGDON ET AL., supra note 49, at 239-483.
54. SEARS & ZEMANSKY, supra note 44, at 117.
202 [Vol. 16:191
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by comparison with similar vehicle results.55 In addition, the side
stiffness constant can also be determined by mathematical means
if crush depths and the striking vehicle's stiffness are known. The
momentum methods discussed earlier are accurate and useful in
the calculation of speeds involved in side impact collisions. 56 Their
combined use provides the expert with quantifiable confirmation
of results based on measurable physical evidence collected at the
scene in the form of photographs and measurements.
The- mathematical models set forth in this article have been
validated by independent scientific study.57 In 1977 and 1978
definitive research was conducted at Cornell University's Vehicle
Experimental Research Facility under contract with the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration. This RICSAC
study (Research Input for Computer Simulation of Automobile
Collisions) conducted twelve staged two-car collisions at different
speeds and configurations. The vehicles were completely instru-
mented to record performance parameters, including speed, and
each collision was filmed by ten high speed cameras. The physical
evidence, including skid marks, pavement gouge marks and the
physical crushing of the vehicle, was also gathered and analyzed
by accident reconstruction experts. The experts used the two
mathematical models presented in this article to develop data on
the speed of the vehicles independent of the instrumentation data
provided from the vehicles. Speed data from the actual collision
was compared with the results obtained from the reconstruction
experts. The mathematical models yielded calculated impact
speeds which were within -3 to +3 percent of the impact speeds
recorded by the instrumentation.5"
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of reliable evidence on the speed of a vehicle
cannot be overstated. In both a civil and criminal context evidence
55. CRASH 3 TECHNICAL MANuAL, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION (1982).
56. FRICKE, supra note 46, at 68-4 to 68-5.
57. Raymond R. McHenry & N. J. DeLeys, Vehicle Dynamics in Single Vehicle
Accident-Validation and Extensions of a Computer Simulation, in CALSPAN
REPORT No. VJ-2251-V-3, NTIS-PB 182663 (1968). See also, Ian S. Jones & A. S.
Baum, Research Input for Computer Simulation of Automobile Collisions,
Volume IV-Staged Collision Reconstructions, in CALSPAN REPORT No. ZQ-6057-V-
6, DOT HS 805040 (1978).
58. Terry D. Day & Randall L. Hargens, Further Validation of EDCRASH
Using the RICSAC Staged Collisions, in SAE PAPER 890740 (1989).
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of speed may literally be the focal point of the entire matter. The
rejection of expert testimony may leave a jury with evidence that
is subject to all the weaknesses of human recollection combined
with the untrained witnesses inability to perceive differing dis-
tances within a short time span. The addition of expert testimony
provides the trier of fact with technical expertise which can aid in
their understanding of the physical evidence. In allowing this
expert testimony the court does not relinquish it's responsibility to
assure that any witness, lay or expert, has the skills and data nec-
essary to reach an opinion that would meet the "helpfulness"
requirements of Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
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